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Abstract 
The current study offers an insight into how auction ending rules can affect distribution online 
bidders’ strategies. While traditional wisdom in this area suggested that auction ending rules can 
encourage and suppress certain bidding behaviors, limited efforts have been taken to investigate 
how they can affect winning likelihood and price premium distribution across different bidding 
strategies. To evaluate such impacts of auction ending rules, auction data were collected from two 
auction websites (eBay and Dellauction.com). A total of 288 auction transactions were collected 
and later used in the data analyses. Initial results indicate that auction ending rules do affect 
winning likelihood and distribution of price premium across different bidder classes. A bidding 
strategy that was found effective in generating higher price premium under an auction ending rule 
may not necessarily be effective under a different auction ending rule. Practical implications are 
offered at the end of the study. 
Keywords:  Bidder Strategies, Online Auctions, Auction Ending Rules, and Price Premium  
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Introduction 
Online auctions have become a marketplace for businesses to explore a new group of customers. With the dynamic 
pricing nature of online auctions, businesses can be engaged in a demand-driven production planning and control 
(Bapna et al. 2001). In addition, online auction markets have become a playground for businesses to experiment new 
product ideas and eliminate their excess, obsolete, and perishable inventory. It also allows businesses to estimate 
their demand curves by using demand-driven market information. Despite these enormous benefits of online 
auctions, limited attention has been given to study the impact of different auction ending rules on distribution of 
bidding behaviors and price premium generated different bidder classes.  
 
Understanding online bidding strategies and bidder classes is critical to developing effective auction design 
mechanisms (Bapna et al. 2004). Prior studies found that online bidders adopted different strategies. Each yields 
different winning likelihood (Bapna et al. 2004). Since online auctions allow customers to acquire products/services 
at different prices, different bidding strategies can also produce varying price premium to the auction sellers. This 
opportunity to generate price premium is becoming more critical, especially in this new economy.  
 
The current study is built upon two baseline studies by Roth and Ockenfels (2002) and Bapna et al. (2004). The first 
explored the impact of auction ending rules (hard Vs soft closing) on online bidding behaviors. The latter explored 
bidder taxonomy in multi-itemed auctions and examined winning likelihood and distribution of normalized loss of 
surpluses across different bidder classes. We argue that different levels of normalized loss of surpluses reflect 
different levels of seller’s price premium. Their study unveiled four common bidder classes, including opportunists, 
evaluators, sip-and-dippers, and participators. They later suggested that these bidder classes can evolve and their 
likelihood of winning may change over time.  
 
Taking the concept of bidder evolution into account, we argue that it is important that research in this domain 
regularly reevaluate online bidding strategies and distribution of seller’s price premium produced by different bidder 
profiles. Our study therefore attempts to 1) investigate how auction ending-rules influence distribution of online 
bidding behaviors 2) examine the heterogeneities and commonalities of bidder taxonomy across different auction 
formats and 3) learn how auction ending rules affect distribution of seller’s price premium and bidder’s winning 
likelihood. 
Literature Review 
 
Research in the area of online auctions has substantially grown for the past two decades. Its continued growth is 
partly driven by the limited applicability of traditional auction assumptions to online auctions. Online auction 
markets offer several services that were not otherwise found in traditional auction environments. One of which is the 
use of the auction marketplace as a knowledge repository by bidders. Online auctions also provide its customers 
with concurrent listings of items (Peters and Severinov 2006). With these new functionalities found in online auction 
markets, traditional auction theories can be violated when auctions are implemented in the online platform (Bapna et 
al. 2001).  
The growth of online auction market has been witnessed by its popularity not only from consumer standpoint but 
also from business perspectives. Several large businesses such as Sam’s club have now dedicated a part of their web 
space for online auctions. Other businesses such as Sears, Home Depot, and Disney, etc. have been using an 
established auction marketplace such as eBay to release their obsolete items. Online auctioneers have several 
decisions to make. One of which is to decide whether to adopt a hard-closing or soft-closing ending rules. While 
some researchers recommended that online auction houses offer different auction formats to their participants (i.e. 
Bapna 2003), most online auction websites choose to employ only one ending rule to create a more consistent 
environment for their customers.  
Prior research argued that auction formats can be influential to the formation of bidder strategies. Two theoretical 
pluralisms were proposed by auction researchers. The first stream of research suggested that auction formats (i.e. 
private vs. common value auction) can lead to different bidding patterns and different auction outcomes (i.e. 
Milgrom and Weber 1982; Engelbrechtt-Wiggans 1987). The other stream of research however suggested that 
 Muthitacharoen / Online Bidder Heterogeneities and Auction Ending Formats 
  
 Thirtieth International Conference on Information Systems, Phoenix 2009 3 
auction winners under a certain auction rule are more likely to be winners again under a different auction rules 
(Myerson 1981; Bulow and Roberts 1989).  
Despite these different schools of thought, auction researchers seem to agree that different bidding strategies incur 
different costs to the bidders such as search costs in determining a valuation of product/service of interest, 
monitoring cost, and opportunity cost to participate in other alternative auctions (Easley and Tenorio 2004; Bapna et 
al. 2004). Thus, understanding how different bidding strategies affect bidder’s winning likelihood and the 
distribution of price premium under different auction ending rules can be of values not only to the online auctioneers 
and sellers but also to the bidders. Online bidders can use this information to revise their bidding approaches in the 
future. Below, we discuss how auction ending rules can affect bidding behaviors in the online auction environment. 
Auction Formats and its Impacts on Bidding Behaviors 
 
Auction formats and their impacts on bidding behaviors have long been witnessed by prior research. For instance, it 
was argued that single early bid is a dominant strategy for bidders in the private-valued second-priced auction 
environment (Vickrey 1961). The popularity of this bidding strategy has however dwindled with the introduction of 
online auctions. It was claimed that late bidding strategy has become a mainstream bidding approach and it has 
received tremendous attention from auction researchers (i.e. Bajari and Hortacsu 2003; Roth and Ockenfels2002). In 
a survey report, 91% of the respondents claimed that late bidding is a part of their early planned bidding strategy 
(Roth and Ockenfels 2002). Its popularity is perhaps attributed to its ability to create collusive equilibrium (avoid 
bidding war) and to reduce unnecessary price increase (Roth and Ockenfels 2002). In addition, late bidding helps 
delay disclosing true valuation of the items (Roth and Ockenfels 2002). More importantly, late bidding behavior is 
claimed to be an effective response to naïve or incremental biddings. Despite its several benefits, late bidding 
behavior introduces some inherent risks and costs to its bidders. For instance, bidders have to take into consideration 
of the possibility that their bids will not be successfully submitted - perhaps due to erratic Internet traffic (Ockenfels 
and Roth 2006). It can also generate collusions against sellers (Roth and Ockenfels 2002) and produce higher 
monitoring costs. 
With the emergence of online auctions, many more online auction formats have been proposed and adopted by 
various auction houses. Two of which are hard and soft-closing auctions. While hard-closing auctions are those that 
have fixed end time, soft-closing auctions are those that employ extendable end time. Its end time can be extended 
depending upon auction activities prior to the predetermined end time of the auction. Roth and Ockenfels (2002) 
found that hard-closing auction format accentuated late bidding behaviors. In other words, strategic benefits of late 
bidding behaviors are greatly attenuated by soft-closing auction (Ockenfels and Roth 2006) since bidders cannot 
predict with a certainty when the auction will end.  
In a field study, it was found that more than two-thirds of the all eBay (hard-closing) auctions have at least one 
bidder active in the last hour (Roth and Ockenfels 2002). The number of active bidders in the last hour is noticeably 
lower (25%) in Amazon (soft-closing) auctions. The impact of auction ending rule is much more evident when 
considering the reported number of bidders within the last five minutes. It was reported that up to 16% of bidders 
were found in the last 5 minutes of eBay auctions while there is approximately only 1% of bidders found in the 
similar timeframe of Amazon auctions (Roth and Ockenfels 2002).  
While prior studies have produced accumulated evidence of how auction ending rules affect bidding behaviors, 
several questions have remained unanswered. For instance, little attention has been given to examine the impact of 
auction ending rules on other bidding strategies such as incremental bidders. Moreover, it is still unclear if the 
distribution of price premium generated by different bidder profiles will vary in different auction formats. While 
Roth and Ockenfels (2002) argued that hard-closing format provides opportunities for bidders to suppress bids and it 
is likely that winners in these auctions will gain higher profits, there is little empirical evidence for this argument. In 
addition, the winning likelihood of different bidder classes may vary across different auction formats. Our study 
attempts to answer these questions by integrating the knowledge learned from Ockenfels and Roth’s studies to those 
that are discussed below. 
Bidder Profiles, Price Premium, and Winning Likelihood 
 
While prior research have focused their attention on examining effectiveness of bidding strategies in online auction 
marketplace, most of the efforts were spent on the topic of late bidding behavior (i.e. Ockenfels and Roth 2006; 
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Shang and Ling 2004). Few have directed their attention to other bidding approaches such as naïve bidding (i.e. 
Deltas ad Engelbrecht-Wiggans 2005; List and Shogren 1999). In short, naïve bidder is defined as bidders who “do 
not infer any information about the value of the item from the bidding behavior of their opponents” (Deltas ad 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans 2005). It was also claimed that naïve bidders are more likely to stay active in the auction until 
the price reaches the expected value of the object conditional on their signal (Deltas ad Engelbrecht-Wiggans 2005). 
Unlike naïve bidders, rational bidders tend to remain in the auction as long as there is a possibility for s/he to gain 
financial savings (Deltas ad Engelbrecht-Wiggans 2005).  
Traditional wisdom suggested that naïve bidders generally receive lower saving/ lower bidder’s relative surpluses 
and are subject to winner’s curse. Hence, this group of bidders could come to extinction and only rational bidder 
would survive. This traditional wisdom was however challenged in a recent study by Deltas ad Engelbrecht-
Wiggans (2005). They demonstrated that naïve bidder could gain higher surpluses than rational bidders in some 
circumstances, especially when signal distribution is symmetric and unimodal.  
Despite the constellation of works in this area, Bapna and his colleagues (Bapna et al. 2004) demonstrated that other 
bidder classes existed. In their study, two datasets from an online Yankee auction house with multi-itemed format 
were collected. They were auction transactions found in the year of 1999 and 2000. Their study is one of the first 
that employed three factors to examine bidder’s behaviors, including number of bids, time of entry (TOE), and time 
of exit (TOX). Using the three factors to perform cluster analyses, their study unveiled four common bidder profiles 
across the two datasets – opportunists, evaluators, sip-and-dippers, and participators. Opportunists are those that 
place a single bid very close to the end of the auction to improve their chances of winning. Evaluators are arguably 
similar to opportunist in that they make a single bid. Their bids are however placed earlier in the auction. Sip and 
dippers generally follow a two-bid strategy. Participators are engaged in the auction and normally put in multiple 
bids. The above discussion indicated that participators share several qualities with naïve bidders discussed above.  
In addition to these four common bidder classes, two unique bidder classes emerged in their data. One of which is 
called agent bidders. The emergence of agent bidders was arguably attributed to the automatic bidding agent, a new 
functionality offered by the auction house in 2000. The results also revealed another unique bidder class called 
middle evaluators. This bidder class signified the role of TOE and TOX. It also raises a question whether other 
bidder classes such as sip-and-dippers and participators can be further segmented according to their TOE and TOX.  
Since Bapna’s study was conducted in a multi-itemed auction environment, one may question if their findings will 
also be applicable in single-itemed auctions. Thus, another primary goal of this study is to explore if the bidder 
classes found in the multi-itemed environment can also be found in single-itemed auction platform. Rothkopf and 
Harstad (1994) argued that results found in single-itemed auctions may not carry over into multiple-itemed auction 
settings. Tenorio (1999) further supported this idea by arguing that bidders in a multi-itemed auctions are required to 
make lumpy bids if their goal is to acquire multiple items. Such a requirement does not however exist in a single-
itemed auction.  
 
Bapna’s study revealed additional interesting information such as distribution of winning likelihood and bidder’s 
normalized loss of surpluses across different bidder profiles. In short, they found that opportunists have higher 
winning likelihood (Bapna et al. 2004). Such higher winning likelihood may stem from the fact that these bidders 
have monitored the auctions for a longer period of time and therefore develop a more realistic valuation of the 
products. Participators are however demonstrably having lower winning likelihood when compared to opportunists. 
They are reportedly received higher consumer surpluses than other bidder classes. Bapna and his colleagues argued 
that participators are generally placed their bid at the minimum requirement, resulting in their higher surpluses 
(Bapna et al. 2004 p. 35). For a more complete analysis of winning likelihood and normalized loss of surplus 
distribution, please see Bapna et al. 2004.  
Research Method 
 
To investigate heterogeneities and commonalities of bidder taxonomies under different auction ending rules, two 
datasets were acquired from two online auction houses, including eBay and dellauction.com. With this selection of 
the two online auctioneers, we are able to control many external factors that can influence bidders’ strategies. 
Firstly, we are able to focus on a single seller who participated in auctions with different auction ending rules during 
the same period of time. We found that Dell Computer Inc. offered its products through its own auction sites 
(dellauctions.com) and also through eBay.  Dell Computer Inc. has been an eBay member since 2001 while it has 
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operated and maintained its own online auction house since 1999. While eBay adopted hard-closing ending rule, 
dellauction.com employed a soft-closing auction format. If a bid is placed ten minutes prior to the end time, the 
auction’s end time will be further extended by another ten minutes. By having only one seller in our data set, the 
impacts of sellers’ reputation on bidder’s strategies are minimized. Secondly, we are able to focus only on a single 
product which later allows us to rule out the impact of product heterogeneities on bidding behaviors. Ockenfels and 
Roth (2006) suggested that product types can affect bidding strategies among online bidders.  
 
Approximately 9,000 auction transactions were collected over the two-month period. Two spider programs were 
developed to automatically collect data from the two auction websites. The first program helped find new auction 
listings that were offered by Dell Computer Inc. It downloaded and stored the auction listing information in HTML 
format on an SQL server database. Information such as listing number, start date, start time, end date, and end time 
were later extracted and maintained in the database. The other program used the extracted information to monitor 
the websites and downloaded additional information such as final price, etc after the auction ended.  
It is important to note that while the baseline study focused on the distribution of normalized loss of surplus across 
different bidder profiles, such a measure of bidding effectiveness cannot be used in this study. The normalized loss 
of surpluses in the baseline study was partly calculated by finding the difference between winning price and the 
lowest winning price. This calculation process can be performed when there is more than one winner at an auction 
or in a multi-itemed auction format. Since the current study focuses on single-itemed auctions, we adopt price 
premium – a more commonly used measure of bidding effectiveness in online auction research. To ensure a fair 
comparison of price premiums across bidder profiles and auction ending rules, we narrowed our products down to 
one single product – Dell Optiplex GX60/SFF, rending a final sample of 77 auctions from eBay and 211 auctions 
from dellauction.com. All computer products in these auctions have identical specifications such as hard drive, 
memory, etc. In addition, these auctions adopted 3-day auction duration which enabled us to control another external 
factor (auction duration) that could have an impact on bidder’s strategies. With 288 auction observations, there are 
559 and 1,220 bidders participating in eBay and dellauction samples, respectively. The information regarding 
number of bids, TOE, and TOX of each bidder were extracted from auction bidding history pages and later used to 
perform cluster analyses. 
Data Analysis and Initial Results 
 
The data analysis technique used in the current study mirrored the approach used by our baseline study (Bapna et al. 
2004). Three factors, including number of bids, TOE, and TOX, were employed in a hierarchical cluster analysis. To 
identify TOE, number of elapsed seconds between the auction’s end time and the time that first bids were entered 
were calculated. Similar process was followed to calculate TOX. The only difference is the times that bidders 
entered their final bids, not first bids, were used in the calculation of TOX. Thus, bidders who entered only one bid 
into the auctions will have identical TOE and TOX.  
A guideline suggested by Hair et al. (1998) was used to identify appropriate number of clusters found in each 
dataset. Cluster analyses were performed separately on the two datasets. The analyses revealed 9 and 12 bidder 
classes in dellauction (soft-closing) and eBay (hard-closing) samples, respectively. Table 1 shows membership 
information across two different auction websites. Table 2 shows distribution of price premium and winning 
likelihood across different bidder classes.  
Our initial results revealed commonalities and heterogeneities of bidder profiles under the two different auction 
ending rules. First, the four common bidder classes (opportunists, evaluators, sip-and-dippers, and participators) 
found in the baseline study were also discovered in both of our datasets. Our results demonstrated that the timing 
concept can be applied not only to the evaluator group but also to other bidder classes. Bapna and his colleagues 
(2004) found two evaluator groups (early and middle evaluators) in one of their samples. They were separated by 
their TOE and TOX. We however found that sip-and-dippers and participators can also be further segmented 
according to their TOE and TOX. For instance, the participator group in the soft-closing auction was further divided 
into two subgroups, including early participators and late participators (See Table 1). There are three groups of 
participators found in the hard-closing auctions (eBay). 
We also found that the timing concept help identify more bidder classes in the hard-closing auctions. Some bidder 
classes that were found in the hard-closing auction did not necessarily emerged in the soft-closing auctions. Example 
of those bidder classes are middle participators, middle 3 (mid3) evaluators, and middle sip-and-dippers. Despite 
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this difference, we found that evaluator was the most popular strategy in both soft and hard-closing auctions. Its 
popularity is perhaps attributed to its relatively low monitoring cost. Opportunists were found most effective 
strategy in term of their winning likelihood. Approximately 50% of auction under both auction-ending rules were 
won by opportunists. The difference between opportunists and evaluators lies in their TOE and TOX. Both bidder 
classes generally place only one bid but opportunists take advantage of their bids by entering their bids close to the 
end of the auction. 
 
Table 1: Cluster Analysis Results in Soft-Closing and Hard-Closing Auctions 
 
   Soft-Closing Auctions    Hard-Closing Auctions 
 Number of x ̄number of bids x ̄TOE x ̄TOX  Number of x ̄number of bids x ̄TOE x ̄TOX 
Bidders Groups  Member (S.D)
 
(S.D)
 
(S.D)  Members (S.D) 
 
(S.D)
 
(S.D) 
 
Early Evaluators    24  1.00 3,689.45 3,689.45          26  1.04 3,910.74 3,893.70 
 (1.97%) (0.00) (428.33) (428.33)   (4.65%) (0.20) (210.72) (249.71) 
 
Mid1 Evaluators    34  1.00 2,162.54 2,162.54          67  1.00 2,899.24 2,899.24 
 (2.79%) (0.00) (336.26) (336.26) (11.99%) (0.00) (330.97) (330.97) 
 
Mid2 Evaluators  248  1.00 1,077.70 1,077.70          51  1.00 1,886.74 1,886.74 
   (20.33%) (0.00) (229.73) (229.73)   (9.12%) (0.00) (195.10) (195.10) 
 
Mid3 Evaluators N/A   N/A       N/A        N/A          40  1.00 1,279.80 1,279.80 
       (7.16%) (0.00) (127.80) (127.80) 
 
Late Evaluators  311  1.00    455.19    455.19          63  1.00   677.65   677.65 
   (25.49%) (0.00)  (147.96)  (147.96) (11.27%) (0.00) (176.82) (176.82) 
 
Early Sip & Dippers    22  2.14 2,435.06 1,078.95          36  2.69 2,526.23 1,350.42 
 (1.80%) (0.47)  (917.83)  (537.64)   (6.44%) (0.71) (920.75) (793.00) 
 
Mid Sip & Dippers N/A   N/A        N/A       N/A          29  2.07 1,091.66   653.19 
       (5.19%) (0.26) (410.26) (417.03) 
 
Late Sip & Dippers  151  2.00    422.16    296.57          42  2.00  109.12    85.86 
   (12.38%) (0.00)  (402.15)  (327.65)   (7.51%) (0.00) (120.85)  (95.03) 
 
Early Participators      4  6.50 1,546.51    397.98             7 12.28 1,984.53 1,221.49 
 (0.33%) (5.77)   (1,244.12)  (487.88)   (1.25%) (3.35)   (1,671.62)  (1,596.33) 
 
Mid Participators N/A   N/A        N/A       N/A          19  5.37 1,169.32   312.30 
       (3.40%) (0.50)    (1,462.36)   (459.23) 
 
Late Participators    79  3.28    479.60    232.47          30  3.33    293.18   109.70 
 (6.48%) (0.50)  (491.97)  (302.24)   (5.37%) (0.48)  (359.38)  (209.50) 
 
Opportunists  347  1.00      92.56      92.56        149  1.00    131.27   131.27 
   (28.44%) (0.00)    (72.98)    (72.98) (26.65%) (0.00)  (128.65)  (128.65) 
 
Total Bidders   1,220       559 
 
  
In term of price premium distribution, we found that late participators have significantly produced higher price 
premium than other bidder classes in the soft-closing auction environments. ANOVA test was performed and it 
confirmed this finding. In the hard-closing auction, we cannot make a similar conclusion due to the limited number 
of winners found in each bidder class. It is however worth noting that opportunists, in the hard-closing auctions, are 
those that have noticeably paid lower prices when compared to other winners. A similar observation can also be 
drawn for the soft-closing auctions (See Table 2).  
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Table 2: Price Premium Distribution and Winning Likelihood across Bidder Profiles 
 
   Soft-Closing Auctions    Hard-Closing Auctions 
 Number of Number
 
x ̄Final Price x ̄ Price Premium Number of  Number of    x̄Final Price  x ̄ Price Premium 
 Non-winners Winners
  
  Non-Winners  Winners 
Bidders Groups    (% of winners)                         (% of winners) 
 
Early Evaluators   24   0 (0.00%)       N/A     N/A      26     0 (0.00%)       N/A          N/A 
Mid1 Evaluators   34   0 (0.00%)       N/A     N/A      66     1 (1.30%) $150.00       5.83% 
Mid2 Evaluators 244   4 (1.90%) $130.00 -1.12%      51     0 (0.00%)       N/A          N/A 
Mid3 Evaluators N/A           N/A       N/A     N/A      39     1 (1.30%) $142.54       0.57% 
Late Evaluators 289 22 (10.43%) $116.41    -11.46%      56     7 (9.09%) $147.51     -0.16% 
Early Sip & Dippers   22   0 (0.00%)       N/A      N/A      33     3 (3.90%) $147.67    4.19% 
Middle Sip & Dippers N/A           N/A       N/A      N/A      28    1 (1.30%) $151.00       6.54% 
Late Sip & Dippers 114 37(17.54%) $135.08   2.75%      27 15(19.48%) $158.68  11.96% 
Early Participators     2   2 (0.95%) $122.50 -6.82%        6    1 (1.30%) $177.50     25.24% 
Middle Participators N/A           N/A       N/A      N/A      14    5 (6.49%) $180.23     27.16% 
Late Participators   48 31(14.69%) $149.71 13.87%      25    5 (6.49%) $137.42     -3.04% 
Opportunists 231   115(54.50%) $128.50 -2.26%    111  38(49.35%) $128.69  -9.20% 
Total Winners           221           77 
 
Discussion, Implications, and Directions for Future Research 
 
We believe that our study produced interesting and promising results. As mentioned earlier, the current study 
demonstrated that bidder classes found in a multi-itemed auction can be carried over to the single-itemed auctions 
(both for soft-closing and hard-closing). It also demonstrated that the timing concept can be applied to all bidder 
classes. This finding allowed us to investigate the impact of timing of bids more thoroughly – an extended 
examination from the baseline study. Firstly, we found that late bidding strategy is the most popular strategy within 
each bidder class but only for the soft-closing auctions. For example, late evaluator class has more bidders than any 
other evaluator classes. Similar finding can be observed in other bidder classes under the soft-closing ending rule. It 
is however worth noting that late bidding strategy did not gain as much relative popularity under the hard-closing 
auctions. In this auction format, bidders are almost evenly distributed such as those found in the evaluator classes 
(See Table 1). Despite the difference in the membership distribution of late bidders under the two auction ending 
rules, our result unveiled that the late biding strategy was universally more effective within each bidder group. For 
instance, we found a much higher winning likelihood for late sip-and-dippers (17.54%) when compared to early sip-
and-dippers (0%) under the soft-closing auctions. Similar results were observed in other bidder groups (participators 
and evaluators) and under both auction-ending rules (See Table 2). 
 
Secondly, we observed an implicit relationship between bid timing and number of bids placed by online bidders. In 
the soft-closing auctions, for instance, average number of participator’s bids decreased from 6.5 bids (early 
participators) to 3.28 bids (late participators). Similar observation was also made for the hard-closing auctions. Such 
a relationship suggested that participators placed fewer bids as the auctions came closer to the end. This relationship 
can perhaps be attributed to the fact that auction prices are generally becoming higher as the auctions approach the 
end time. These higher prices therefore become prohibitive for participators to be aggressive in placing more bids.  
 
We additionally compared our results to those reported in the baseline study. To ensure a fair comparison, we 
combined common bidder classes in our dataset to match the four bidder classes in the baseline study. In the 
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baseline study, there appears a significant disparity in the bidder strategy popularity, especially in their year 2000 
dataset. Evaluators and opportunists strategies were reported to be used almost as often by online bidders (39% and 
35%, respectively) while others have gained much lower acceptance (i.e. participators – 12% and sip-and-dippers – 
10%). We however found that evaluator strategy, in our samples, was much more popular than other bidding 
strategies (44.19% in hard-closing and 50.57% in soft-closing auctions). Opportunists are also considered a 
frequently used strategy but not as popular as those found in the baseline study (26.65% in hard-closing and 28.44% 
in soft-closing auctions). 
 
The current study additionally found that opportunist and sip-and-dipper strategies yielded higher winning 
likelihood in both auction formats. This finding is similar to those reported in the baseline study but there appears to 
be a larger disparity in their winning likelihood. For instance, opportunist strategy was reportedly won 
approximately 50% of the auctions in our dataset (both soft and hard-closing) while sip-and-dipper strategy won 
approximately 17% (soft-closing) to 25% (hard-closing) of all auctions. Such a disparity is perhaps attributed to the 
different auction formats used in the two studies (multi-itemed Vs single-itemed auctions). In the current study, we 
focused only on single-itemed auctions where there can be only one winner per auction. The baseline study 
employed data from multi-itemed auctions. This auction format allows multiple winners per auction and perhaps 
increases winning likelihood of sip-and-dippers.  
 
When comparing distribution of price premium to the baseline study, our results revealed a very different story. 
Bapna and his colleagues (2004) reported that participators had significantly lower loss of surpluses or gained larger 
saving than the three other bidder classes. Our results indicated otherwise. Participators, in our study, were found to 
produce highest price premium to the auction sellers and thus receiving lowest relative financial saving. They paid 
on average up to 25% higher than other bidder classes. The baseline study claimed that the larger saving of 
participators stems from their marginal/incremental bidding strategy. We however argue that the higher number of 
bids found in the participator group is indicative of their high commitment and perhaps their high emotional 
involvement to win the auctions. This bidder characteristic is probably an attributable cause of higher price premium 
generated by this bidder class. Further, there is only one winner in the single-itemed auction while there can be more 
than one winner in multi-itemed auctions. Bidders in the single-itemed auctions therefore have to be more 
aggressive and avoid using incremental bidding strategy since the risk of not winning the auction is higher. 
 
Taking the higher price premiums produced by participators into account, we recommend that online auctioneers 
should develop an auction mechanism that promotes this bidding behavior. One alternative is to consider revising 
bid increment rule to draw more participatory behaviors to the auctions. eBay, for example, is currently adopting a 
progressive bid increment policy where bidders are obligated to place higher bid increments as the auction prices 
reach higher levels (see http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/bid-increments.html). Such a policy may prohibit bidders 
from being aggressive in placing multiple bids. Thus, reducing bid increment as the auction approaches the end time 
may create more excitement and enhance bidder’s commitment to win the auction. Such a strategy is currently 
adopted by some other auctioneers such as uBids.com. 
 
Our study faces some limitations and constraints. First, the nature of field study provided us with a limited control 
over sample sizes. The imbalanced of sample sizes across the two auction formats (soft and hard-closing auctions) 
prevented us from examining some issues at a more granular level. Second, by using auction data that were offered 
from the same seller, the current study did not offer an insight of how other auction design factors can affect bidding 
behaviors. We argue that auction duration and opening bids, among many auction design factors, can also have 
influential role in shaping bidders’ strategies and their effectiveness. For instance, auctions that were offered for a 
longer period of time may experience more bidder classes since their TOE and TOX can vary more. Also, auction 
with higher opening bids may be more or less attractive to some bidder classes –potentially producing different 
results in the winning likelihood and price premium distribution. We encourage future research to explore such 
factors and their impacts on bidder strategies in their own right. 
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